

BRISTOL CITY COUNCIL

Audit Committee

Date: 28 June 2013

Report of: Service Director, Safer Bristol

Title: Business Continuity Annual Report

Ward: City-wide

Officer presenting report: Jim Gillman

Contact telephone number: 92 24313

Recommendation:

To note the contents of the report.

Summary:

This paper is a follow-up to the paper presented to the Audit Committee in January 2013. In particular, it updates members on:

- the report and recommendations following Exercise Laveer;
- critical service managers and the inclusion of a continuity related element within their PMDS, and;
- the loss of the CPU GIS officer.

1. Policy and Context

1.1 Business Continuity (BC) requirements are set out in the Civil Contingencies Business Continuity Policy Statement, available on [the Source](#). Adopting a managed approach to BC is a statutory duty under the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004. The Civil Protection Unit lead on the delivery of all the duties imposed on Bristol City Council by the Civil Contingencies Act, including BC duties. The Corporate Civil Contingencies Group (CCCG) oversees the process. The CCCG is made up of 2nd tier Directorate Champions representing all Directorates.

1.2 The aim of the BC programme is to build 'organisational resilience' - to ensure that the Council is able to keep critical services running during

emergencies, such as flooding and disruptions to usual working conditions, such as a loss of IT services.

2. Exercise Laveer

The full exercise report is attached. This was presented to the Corporate Civil Contingencies Group on 19 April. The Group accepted all the recommendations.

Progress on recommendations:

- 1) Formation of a 'Flood Coordination Group' – complete.
- 2) Review of Directorate Contingency Plans – on-going.
- 3) Identification of Directorate incident management staff – on-going. Awareness training to be delivered through the Monthly Managers meetings, giving access to all Strategic and Service Managers..
- 4) Raising the profile of emergency and continuity planning in CYPS – on-going. Report going to CYPS DLT on 3 July.
- 5) Impact of losing G27 – complete. Design for an alternative in Temple Street agreed.
- 6) Review incident management procedures – on-going.
- 7) Provide Service Directors with an overview of their ICT resilience – complete. Letters sent to all Service Directors in March.
- 8) Raise awareness in Neighbourhood Partnerships of community resilience issues – ongoing.

3. Critical Service Managers

In the report presented to the Audit Committee in January, it was reported that 47% of critical service managers who responded to the query had a business continuity related PMDS element. A similar survey conducted in May this year suggested 66% now had a BC related PMDS element.

As importantly, these responsibilities will be embedded more permanently as part of the People Programme. New job families and job descriptions are being developed and will be rolled out throughout the whole organisation. This will include responsibility and accountability for civil contingencies and business continuity.

Comprehensive accountability already exists for Strategic Directors and Service Directors. Arrangements will be strengthened for Service Managers and other staff.

4. Losing the CPU GIS Officer

Further to the January 2013 report, the following measures have been taken to mitigate the impact of losing the CPU GIS officer post:

- Before leaving, the outgoing GIS officer gave all CPU staff training on the GIS tools that had been developed.
- The outgoing GIS officer left a comprehensive user guide.
- A GIS analysis has been identified from within Corporate GIS to be the 'lead' and first point of contact for GIS-related support.
- Support is available from the 2 GIS volunteers familiar with the CPU GIS tools. These volunteers were trained by the outgoing GIS officer and their contact details are kept in the Emergency Contact Directory.

5. Equalities Impact Assessment

No implications arising from this report

6. Legal and Resource Implications

Legal: None sought

Financial: None sought

7. Appendices: Exercise Laveer Report



Exercise Report

Exercise Laveer: 5 December 2012, City Hall

Contents

1. Background and Information
 2. Scenario
 3. Exercise Structure
 4. Participants
 5. Debrief and Feedback
 6. Recommendations
 7. Acknowledgements
- Appendix A: List of Participants
Appendix B: Feedback Form
Appendix C: Feedback Report

1. Background and Information

Exercise Laveer was held on 5 December 2012 at City Hall. Over 60 officers representing all of the Council's Directorates took part (for a full list of participants see Appendix A).

The exercise was held as part of Bristol City Council's (BCC's) preparations for emergencies and in part fulfilment of BCC's duties as a Category 1 Responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Aim of the exercise

To activate a corporate wide response to a high impact scenario, testing elements of incident response and continuity planning.

Exercise objectives

- To test the activation of the Incident Management Room
- To test the operation of Directorate Continuity Teams
- To raise awareness of relevant emergency response and continuity plans, including the IMP, Directorate Continuity Plans and the Flood Plan
- To examine BCC's ability to deliver critical activities during IT and workspace disruptions

2. Scenario

The scenario for Exercise Laveer, constructed with support from BCC's Flood Risk Team and the Environment Agency, was a major flooding event. The scenario imagined:

- Saturated ground following a Summer and Autumn of wet weather
- The remnants of Hurricane Tony bringing a series of severe weather fronts over the UK
- Extremely heavy overnight rain bringing significant surface water flooding to south Bristol
- A slow moving morning deluge over central Bristol coinciding with a high tide and a tidal surge giving significant flooding in the M32, City Centre and harbourside areas
- A high tide forecast with a larger tidal surge for the evening predicted to cause further, more widespread flooding
- Flooding and loss of a major electricity substation, leading to the loss of power to a large part of central and east Bristol

3. The Exercise Structure

Laveer was a desktop exercise. Participants played either as part of the Incident Management Team (IMT) or in their Directorate Continuity Teams. The exercise was held in 3 rooms. G27 hosted the Incident Management Team. The Lord Mayors Reception room hosted the N&CD and CYPS Directorate Continuity Teams and Committee Room 15 hosted the CS and HSC Directorate Continuity Teams.

An Exercise Control room was located in U39, where volunteer staff fed injects and information, including weather forecasts, flood maps and situation reports into the IMT and Directorate teams. Participants were required to apply their knowledge and experience to the scenario presented and agree appropriate courses of action.

4. Participants

Players: CPU worked with Directorates to identify those staff and services that would benefit most from being involved in the exercise. These included those with a frontline role preparing for flooding, such as the Highways team and those whose services might be most disrupted by a flood event, such as the Intermediate Care Team in Health and Social Care.

Facilitators: Directorate Continuity Coordinators from each of the Directorates acted as facilitators for the Directorate Continuity Teams, helping the teams to organise and understand the scenario.

Exercise Directors: CPU staff made up the exercise Directors, with an Exercise Director located in each of the 3 exercise rooms and Exercise Control throughout the exercise.

Outside Agencies / Observers: representatives from the Police, Fire Service, NHS Bristol and Bristol Community Health participated in the exercise and hot debrief sessions, giving valuable feedback.

5. De-briefs and Feedback

Hot Debriefs: two hot debriefs were held on the day. One for the IMT and one for the Directorate Teams. Further wash-ups were held among the CPU team and with the 2 participating Directorate Continuity Champions.

Principle issues covered in debriefs and wash-ups included:

- Role of the IMT vis-a-vis the multi-agency coordinating groups
- Staff expectations of ICT resilience
- Information management in the IMT
- The strengths and use of AIMS
- The strength of Directorate teams

- The ability of Directorate teams to act as incident management teams

Feedback forms

All participants were asked to complete a feedback form at the end of the exercise. An example feedback form can be found at Appendix B. A breakdown of the feedback from forms can be found at Appendix C.

A full summary of the feedback provided is available from the Civil Protection Unit on request.

What went well?

- The exercise was well received and participants engaged fully with the scenario
- The pre-exercise briefings and AIMS training were well received
- The maps and other exercise documents were well received
- The incident management team worked well as a group
- Having emergency service colleagues in the Incident Management Team was very useful
- The HSC Directorate Team organised themselves quickly
- Having a PA on the HSC Directorate Team worked well
- Having health colleagues sitting with the HSC Directorate team was useful

What went less well?

- Communication between the IMT and Directorate teams was not good
- The IMT found it difficult to task Directorate teams
- Consequently, Directorate teams were under-employed at times and struggled to find their role
- Managing the information coming into the IMT was challenging, this included mapping areas affected by flooding as well as the numerous requests for assistance and updates from other agencies, members of the public and partner agencies
- Very few CYPS staff participated in the exercise

Were the objectives achieved?

1. To test the activation of the Incident Management Room
Verdict: achieved
2. To test the operation of Directorate Continuity Teams
Verdict: partially achieved. This identified the requirement to consider Directorate incident / continuity response and capacity more closely
3. To raise awareness of relevant emergency response and continuity plans, including the IMP, Directorate Continuity Plans and the Flood Plan
Verdict: achieved

4. To examine BCC's ability to deliver critical activities during IT and workspace disruptions
Verdict: partially achieved. Highlighted the need to communicate IT resilience more clearly across the organisation.

6. Recommendations

The recommendations are made for consideration of the Corporate Civil Contingencies Group (CCCG). They are based on the results of de-briefs and feedbacks forms, as well as the judgements of the Civil Protection Unit and observers from other agencies.

Each recommendation is assigned to a Directorate(s), a team or an individual. Each recommendation is also given a time scale. The Corporate Civil Contingencies Group will decide which of these recommendations, if any, will be followed up, by whom and in what timescale.

- i. Formation of a flood coordinating group to bring all the BCC teams with an interest in flood management, resilience, response and recovery together to consider the risk in line with the Lead Local Flood Authority role under the Flood and Water Management Act 2010.

Responsibility: Civil Protection Unit (CPU) / Flood Risk Team
By: 28 Feb 2013

- ii. All Directorates to review their Directorate Business Continuity plans and consider their Directorate Incident Management procedures. Once reviewed, to raise awareness of procedures in Directorate Leadership Teams and across Directorates.

Responsibility: Directorate Contingency Champions to task Directorate leads
By: end of April 2013

- iii. Clearer identification of, and incident management training for, Directorate continuity team members.

Responsibility: Directorates & CPU
By: end of June 2013

- iv. CYPS to consider how it can raise the profile of emergency and continuity planning to ensure emergency response and resilience work reaches all critical teams and staff.

Responsibility: CYPS Directorate Champion supported by CPU
By: April 2013

- v. Consider the impact of losing G27 as the Council's Incident Management Room as a result of the Council House refurbishment. How will this be replaced?

Responsibility: CPU and CCGG
By: end of April 2013

vi. Review Incident Management Room procedures, with particular reference to information management.

Responsibility: CPU
By: end of April 2013

vii. Provide an overview for Service Directors regarding the resilience of their ICT services.

Responsibility: CPU and CICT
By: end of March 2013

viii. To raise awareness in Neighbourhood Partnerships of the role they can play in building Community Resilience.

Responsibility: CPU supported by Neighbourhood Coordinators
By: end of September 2013

7. Acknowledgements

It would not have been possible to hold this exercise without the support of volunteers from across the Council. Volunteers played crucial roles in the Incident Management Room, Exercise Control and the Directorate rooms.

Appendix A: Participants and Roles

Corporate Services

Name	Job title	Notes
Adam Smith	Security Services	DT
Alex Simpson	Principal IT Officer	DT
Christine Castle	Business Support Manager	DT
Ian Haddrell	Premises Manager, FM	DT
John Cousins	Senior IT Officer	DT
Nick Gingell	Fleet Services Manager	DT
Sharon Scull	Account Management Officer, ICT	DT
Tim Farrance	Infrastructure Manager, ICT	DT
Alyson Bush	Customer Service	EC
Chris Sheppard	IT Officer, ICT	EC
Teresa Coles	CSP Team Manager	EC
Marie Halilovich	Local Tax	IMT
Mark Williams	Programme Manager, HR	IMT
Paul Arrigoni	Service Director, ICT	IMT
Peter Wood	Senior Manager, Media	IMT
Rizwan Tariq	CSC Manager	IMT
Andrew Knight	Local Tax	IMT AIMS
Heather Arnold	ICT	IMT AIMS
Pete Franklin	Corporate Performance	IMT AIMS

Children and Young People's Services

Name	Job title	Notes
Ann Farmer	Service Manager, Safeguarding	DT
Jeff Britton	Risk Resilience and Wellbeing	DT
Mike Bosdet	Building Practice Manager (N&CD)	DT
Sue Nolan	Building Practice Manager (N&CD)	DT
Tim Scullard	Education Client Unit Manager	DT
Michael Branaghan	Strategy Leader – Capital, Assets and Schools	IMT

Health and Social Care

Name	Job title	Notes
Jackie White	Business Support Manager	DT
Jayne Clifford	Service Manager, Re-ablement Services	DT
John Hilton	Principal Catering and Contract Manager	DT
Joyce Gregory-Morris	Team Manager, Care Direct	DT
Kirsty Poole	PA, HSC	DT
Ros Cox	Team Manager, Transitions and Carers	DT
Sandra Johnston	Team Manager, Re-ablement Services	DT
Steve Jenkins	Team Manager, Residential and Older Peoples Services	DT

Su Tucker	Locality Social Work Teams	DT
Suzanne Ponsford	Operational Manager – Longer Term Services	DT
Teresa Lonergan	Catering Operations Officer	DT
Suzanne Boulton	Business Support Manager	DT AIMS
Nikki Cole	Operations Manager, HSC	IMT

Neighbourhoods and City Development

Name	Job title	Notes
Andrew Clements	Performance Improvement Manager	DT
Chris Harper	Central Services Manager	DT
Geoffrey Robinson	Head of Building Practice	DT
Jim Creamer	Streetworks and Licensing Manager	DT
John Barrow	Public Health Services Manager	DT
Matthew Sugden	Flood Risk Technician	DT
Paul Robson	Building Control Team Manager	DT
Pete Woodhouse	Passenger Transport Manager	DT
Philip Winstanley	Waste Disposal and Operations Manager	DT
Tony Nichols	Harbourmaster	DT
Shaun Popel	EC	DT AIMS
Andy Bruce	EC	EC
Mike Brewer	Highways	EC
Vicky O'Loughlin	Safer Bristol, Comms	EC
Kimberley Perkins	CPU	EC
Andrew Hartley	CPU	ED
Jim Gillman	CPU	ED
Nigel Parsons	CPU	ED
Simon Creed	CPU	ED
Peter Mann	Service Director, Transport	IM
Anil Bhadresa	Services Manager, Landlord Services	IMT
Duncan Venison	Networks Operations Manager	IMT
Gordon McLanaghan	Emergency Control Manager	IMT
Jonquil Maudlin	Pollution Control Manager	IMT
Patrick Goodey	Flood Risk Engineer	IMT
Richard Nochar	Service Manager, Housing Solutions	IMT
Amy Kedward	EC	IMT AIMS
Angus Krowel	EC	IMT AIMS
Caroline Hopkins	EC	IMT AIMS
Veronica Shorttle	Partnership Administrator	IMT AIMS

Police: Inspector Martin Rowland, Chief Inspector Debbie Palmer-Lawrence

Fire: Pete Davis

Health: Rebecca Fretton, Jo Hudson, Simon Steele

Appendix B: Exercise Feedback Form

Exercise LAVEER – Feedback

5 December 2012

Your role in the exercise	
--------------------------------------	--

1. If you attended a pre-exercise briefing session, was it useful?						
Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Yes
Comments						

2. If you attended AIMS training prior to the exercise, was it relevant to the exercise?						
Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Yes
Comments						

3. Were the objectives of the exercise met?						
Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Fully
Comments						

4. What aspects of the exercise did you find most and least useful?	
Most useful	Least useful

5. Regarding your role in the exercise, what aspects of the exercise went most well and what aspects went least well?

Things that went most well	Things that went least useful

6. Were there any issues raised during the exercise that you would like to receive more training / information on?

--

7. Do you have any other comments about the exercise?

--

Name (optional):

Appendix C: Exercise Feedback Report

1. If you attended a pre-exercise briefing session, was it useful?

Of those that attended the session, the average feedback score was 4

The comments from the sessions was that the content of the course was good and provided good background material, a very useful reminder, it prepared people for what was to unfold and got people making preparations. Individuals appreciated being emailed the presentation when they were unable to attend.

Though it was aimed at senior level staff members and the directorates were unsure what they were supposed to do.

2. If you attended AIMS training prior to the exercise, was it relevant to the exercise?

Of those that attended the training prior to the exercise, the average feedback score was 5

The comments from the training said that it very useful and that it helped prepare for the actual exercise and acted as a refresher but individuals would have liked more practical time. They believed it was the key to the success of exercise.

People would have found it useful to see AIMS before the exercise (if they haven't seen it before) and people that didn't use (or have the training) can see the benefit of it.

3. Were the objectives of the exercise met?

The average feedback score was 4

The observer stated that objectives were all considered and generally met.

The procedure was understood but there was very little info provided on follow-up duties and responsibilities. The challenge presented between different teams and the TCG and the SCG; particular in communication of information. Though there was a good level of participation but there was still knowledge gaps identified that would be helpful during a real incident.

It highlighted the areas of concern and it reinforced the need for robust planning and for contingency planning.

4. What aspects of the exercise did you find most and least useful?

Most useful

The exercise proved that an incident could actually happen, the chaotic nature of the event of exercise lead to the realism and showed individuals what was in place and how it could be managed. It also allowed individuals to put into practice training what they knew, how it fits into the bigger picture and the directorates' responsibilities and who is involved. It is gave the opportunity to work with colleagues, become aware of their roles, the sharing of ideas and how they co-ordinate across the council.

Increasing one responsibility within the council during an incident and understanding internal management structure within the council and the way in which the team were managed. The ability for individuals to work under pressure during a hectic time or not follow their instinct on basic issues.

The call handlers gained experience in taking calls, thought the telephone scenarios were quite colourful and covered most possible scenarios and had the opportunity to improvise with regard to the injects to 'tease out' errors and test the call handlers/operators. They thought AIMS was good but not easy to read and kept note of actions. Individuals thought it was it useful learning to see the most important information in a bed of information and familiarity with database.

Least useful

There was a lack of co-ordination of information and flow this information between teams and groups. The access to Directorate details, where to find their task and the inability to communicate effectively with teams (directorate reps). There was a lack of decision making. It provided the opportunity to show what was not in place.

The aims loggers/call handlers not knowing the basic solutions that are in place and were unable to advice the callers on what do in the situation. This may have lead to the comments referencing about the AIMS systems being a bit confusing as to who's doing what. The correct terminology for directorate teams should be used.

Individuals that had to wait to be involved in the exercise could have been called in when required, as in a real incident. The media involvement and activity in the exercise wasn't genuinely integrated into the exercise

There was poor IT projection; the maps could have been produced in higher quality (with street lists). A 2nd AIMS terminal would have been useful.

5. Regarding your role in the exercise, what aspects of the exercise went most well and what aspects went least well?

Most well

The exercise pace, information and injects went well; so did the call handling and the support to the queries. Communicating problems to the IMT via phone or through AIMS; information on AIMS was flowing in well.

The direction by senior staff, good collaboration across in the IMT, directorates understanding risks and responding quickly and the realisation that this would impact on my service and the ability to deal with staffing issue that come up.

Least useful

Too much information was being received with duplication material and not enough support (call handlers) staff available. No communication with between call handles/ AIMS loggers, unable to keep track of inject/call to escalate injects. Some of the prepared injects missed information such as timing and whom the information was meant for.

Felt that team was not decisive enough allowing directorate to make own apparently random decision. Individuals not understanding their exact role in the exercise or getting involved in other services' discussions.

Challenging volume namely of information coming in getting directorates reps at IMT to actions or difficult to hear with two groups in the same room.

The vulnerable adults list is no good in current form and needs to change, it requires more information as should be circulated further.

The exercise was time consuming.

There was no clear exit plan.

6. Were there any issue raised during the exercise that you would like to receive more training/information on?

Individuals would like:

- More AIMS training and remote access to AIMS
- How to act during an event (behaviour etc.)
- Decision making way of working
- How to mass text to staff?
- How to manage staff and non-critical staff?
- Directorates responsibilities, EA updates, explanation of the various plans and how they would be deployed
- Harbour Flood Response Plan
- What key information is held by CPU

- Was able to understand the realistic availability of what would be could be available during a real incident.

Call handlers

- Need to understand where to direct telephone calls, task and actions.
- General understanding of emergency planning and responsibilities.
- That it would be useful to have a pen and paper with each work station

7. Do you have any other comments about the exercise?

Most comments from participants found the exercise enjoyable, though some individuals had not read the plans they were able to respond to the scenario. The observer thought the exercise was well put together and had a good balance of realism.

Individuals found the exercise challenging, with a variety of demands, with the speed of activity but was very rewarding and informative. It exercise demonstrated what we do/don't know about responding to an event. It highlighted elements that will help improve D/R in the future and identified additional elements to be included in Critical Service Continuity Plan.

For practical comments individuals said that the screens with updates were too far away to read, the colours on AIMS were not visually helpful, that it would be useful for managers to know how to use AIMS to communicate effectively and that the maps could have been bigger and clearer.